Since the beginning of product liability litigation in Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has always, whenever the issue was raised which has happened relatively often , rejected any form of strict liability in product liability cases involving prescription medical products. The first case goes back to , and the most recent on-point decision was the aforementioned Tincher case itself.
Pennsylvania precedent rejecting strict liability in prescription medical product liability litigation begins with Henderson v. National Drug Co. An action against a druggist to recover for personal injuries should be ex delicto and not ex contractu.
This consideration, however, does not justify the courts in lowering the standards of proof in tort cases of this kind. If we did so the public interest would be ill served.
Lemmon Pharmacal Co. Under Henderson ,. See Webb v. Zern , A. The first Pennsylvania Supreme Court prescription medical product liability case after Webb was Incollingo v. Ewing , A.
The Restatement reaches the same conclusion as to a product which is incapable of being made safe for its intended use, such as new or experimental drugs, as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience there can be no assurance of safety, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.
Castagna , A. In Incollingo we held that, assuming proper preparation and warning, a manufacturer of drugs is not strictly liable.
Rather, such a manufacturer is liable only if he fails to exercise reasonable care to inform those for whose use the article is supplied of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court returned to the issue of strict liability in prescription medical product liability litigation in Coyle v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. It is unclear in what sense [plaintiffs] contend that the drug was defective beyond that it allegedly carried a risk, of which no warning was given.
It is not alleged that [the drug] was useless for the purpose it was prescribed for, or that it invariably caused the adverse consequences complained of. An allegedly defective prescription medical device a jaw implant , as opposed to a drug, was before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Cafazzo v.
Central Medical Health Services, Inc. The result was the same — a rejection of strict liability. Cafazzo also presaged Tincher by voicing significant second thoughts about strict liability theory under Pennsylvania law. It is. The next year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Hahn v.
Richter , A. The court did not err in declining to give an instruction on strict liability. Wyeth , 85 A. While for policy reasons this Court has declined to extend strict liability into the prescription drug arena. No member of the Lance court indicated — such as by filing a separate opinion — any inclination to change the Hahn rule.
Finally, Tincher , while not involving any prescription medical product, specifically mentioned and preserved the Hahn rule. The Hahn rule was not at issue in Tincher , as Tincher involved only building products that anyone could buy at the local Home Depot — not prescription medical products.
Thus, contrary to Schrecengost , the Tincher court both understood that strict liability is not available for prescription medical products and viewed this exception as harmonious with strict liability generally.
More on that below, after we finish with current Pennsylvania law. As in Lance , no justice on the Tincher court expressed any criticism of the Hahn rule. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has also consistently rejected strict liability in prescription medical product liability litigation.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Next, in Hahn v. Medtronic, Inc. They cite no authority, however, for so restrictive an interpretation either of comment k or of Hahn , nor do they provide significant analysis of the language they seek to apply. We find no reason why the same rational applicable to prescription drugs may not be applied to medical devices. Most recently, in Daniel v.
Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc. However, Daniel did not involve design related claims. In Mazur v. Since [plaintiffs] assert that [defendant] is both strictly liable and liable for negligence in failing to warn.
The Third Circuit thus has never arbitrarily limited the Hahn rule to prescription drugs. This past August, Mills v. Ethicon, Inc. Federal courts, faced with the same issue of Pennsylvania law, have unanimously held that Comment k applies to medical devices, barring strict liability design defect and failure-to-warn claims.
While I am not bound by those cases, I agree with them, and am persuaded by the analysis of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Creazzo. Mills cited Rosenberg v. Bard, Inc. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. Atrium Medical Corp. Bayer Corp. Using data from the Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences, this study finds that women receive shorter sentence lengths than men.
However, contrary to expectation, women of color receive shorter sentences than White women. Additionally, women who are adjudicated in the southern and border districts receive significantly longer sentences.
These findings demonstrate the importance of contextualizing and disaggregating female criminal justice outcomes as well as the need to limit research and discourse that imply a singular shared experience among all women. Is Your Lawyer a Lemon? Governments in the U. These services are frequently provided by assigned counsel, who handle cases for indigent defendants on a contract basis. Court-assigned attorneys generally garner worse case outcomes than privately retained attorneys.
Using detailed court records from one large jurisdiction in Texas, we find that the disparities in outcomes are primarily attributable to case characteristics and within-attorney differences across cases in which they are assigned versus retained.
The selection of low-quality lawyers into assigned counsel and endogenous matching in the private market contribute less to the disparities.
The type and quantity of evidence in a case is a critical factor for deciding guilt but should have little or no influence on the sentencing determinations of judges post conviction; this is because case evidence goes to guilt decisions by triers of fact, whereas sentences are imposed upon those already convicted.
This study examines the effects of evidentiary type and the total quantity of physical evidence in a case on length of custodial sentence. The results demonstrate that violent felony cases with forensic evidence and those cases with more varied pieces of physical evidence result in longer custodial sentences for convicted defendants.
Is there a connection between state-law tort reform and the explosive growth of U. The tort reform literature has established that the number of tort claims in states with tort reform has decreased. Using data gathered from multiple sources, including Lex Machina, DocketX, and the Database of State Tort Law Reforms DSTLR 5th , we find evidence that state tort reform is associated with statistically significant and substantial increases in copyright and patent filings in U.
In contrast, our study does not indicate a similarly significant increase in trademark and trade secret filings. We posit multiple potential explanations for the increase in patent and copyright filings after tort reform and the lack of such increase for trademark and trade secrets filings. What do the experts know?
Forensic handwriting examiners currently testify to the origin of questioned handwriting for legal purposes. However, forensic scientists are increasingly being encouraged to assign probabilities to their observations in the form of a likelihood ratio. This study is the first to examine whether handwriting experts are able to estimate the frequency of US handwriting features more accurately than novices.
The results indicate that the absolute error for experts was lower than novices, but the size of the effect is modest, and the overall error rate even for experts is large enough as to raise questions about whether their estimates can be sufficiently trustworthy for presentation in courts.
When errors are separated into effects caused by miscalibration and those caused by imprecision, we find systematic differences between individuals. Finally, we consider several ways of aggregating predictions from multiple experts, suggesting that quite substantial improvements in expert predictions are possible when a suitable aggregation method is used.
A hash search is a very accurate, computationally efficient technique for testing whether a computer contains illicit material. Although police have been running hash searches for many years, case law is scarce regarding whether and to what extent the Fourth Amendment permits their use.
Rather, courts should treat hash searches as a sort of digital dog sniff. This Note disagrees. It argues first that even accepting the analogy to digital dog sniffs, hash searches nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment under Florida v. Jardines whenever they are used to look for evidence outside the scope of a search warrant or other permissive mechanism.
Moreover, since the decisions in Choctaw, O. To the extent that Trupiano v. United States Kentucky, U. Virginia, U. Louis v. The Ferry Co. Under the earlier view governing the taxability of vessels moving in the inland waters St.
Ferry Co. Old Dominion S. But the rationale of those cases was rejected in Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line Co.
Pennsylvania, U. The formula approved was one which fairly apportioned the tax to the commerce carried on within the state. In that way we placed inland water transportation on the same constitutional footing as other interstate enterprises. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
To the extent that language in the opinion in Mutual Film Corp. Industrial Comm'n The two cases were consolidated and argued last Term and a majority of the Court, with three Justices dissenting and one reserving opinion, held that military trial of Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert for their alleged offenses was constitutional Subsequently, the Court granted a petition for rehearing Now, after further argument and consideration, we conclude that the previous decisions cannot be permitted to stand.
We hold that Mrs. Covert could not constitutionally be tried by military authorities. Petitioner claims that this case is governed by Thompson v.
For the reasons given in a concurring opinion in Armstrong v. The District Court relied primarily on United States v. As we have indicated, that decision may have drawn support from the assumption that if the Court had not passed on the statute's validity in toto it would have left standing a criminal statute incapable of giving fair warning of its prohibitions. But to the extent Reese did depend on an approach inconsistent with what we think the better one and the one established by the weightiest of the subsequent cases, we cannot follow it here.
It, therefore, plainly appears that the factual considerations supporting the failure of the Wolf Court to include the Weeks exclusionary rule when it recognized the enforceability of the right to privacy against the States in , while not basically relevant to the constitutional consideration, could not, in any analysis, now be deemed controlling. Since the facts and circumstances of the two cases are so nearly indistinguishable, we think the Betts v.
Brady holding if left standing would require us to reject Gideon's claim that the Constitution guarantees him the assistance of counsel. Upon full reconsideration we conclude that Betts v.
Brady should be overruled. Not only has the philosophy of Adams been abandoned, but also this Court almost 15 years ago expressly pointed to another opinion of this Court as having "clearly undermined" Adams. Justice Frankfurter's Colegrove opinion contended that Art.
We hold today that the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States. Decisions of the Court since Twining and Adamson have departed from the contrary view expressed in those cases.
We have now overruled Feldman and held that the Federal Government may make no such use of the answers We reject—as unsupported by history or policy—the deviation from that construction only recently adopted by this Court in United States v. We hold that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal witness against incrimination under state as well as federal law.
In our view, however, Pace represents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court. In any event, to the extent that Cicenia or Crooker may be inconsistent with the principles announced today, they are not to be regarded as controlling. In the light of Gideon, Malloy, and other cases cited in those opinions holding various provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, the statements made in West and similar cases generally declaring that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to the States can no longer be regarded as the law.
Breedlove v. Suttles sanctioned its use as "a prerequisite of voting. Internal citation omitted. In accordance with our holdings today and in Escobedo v. Illinois, U. California, U. Lagay, U. We conclude that Cohen v. Hurley should be overruled, that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it.
Indeed, that theory was expressly rejected in a series of decisions following Adler Here again constitutional doctrine has developed since Adler. The premise in Gouled that government may not seize evidence simply for the purpose of proving crime has likewise been discredited. Having concluded that Frank v. Maryland, to the extent that it sanctioned such warrantless inspections, must be overruled, we reverse. We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.
Nothing in the Supreme Court's opinions in Kahriger To this extent Kahriger and Lewis are overruled. We have concluded, however, that Delli Paoli should be overruled. We hold that, because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining petitioner's guilt, admission of Evans' confession in this joint trial violated petitioner's right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
We therefore overrule Delli Paoli Maxwell held that no provision of the Bill of Rights applied to the States—a position long since repudiated—and that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not prevent a State from trying a defendant for a noncapital offense with fewer than 12 men on the jury. In view of the Nardone and Benanti decisions, the doctrine of Schwartz v.
Texas cannot survive the demise of Wolf v. The conclusion of the majority in Hodges rested upon a concept of congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment irreconcilable with the position taken by every member of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases and incompatible with the history and purpose of the Amendment itself. Insofar as Hodges is inconsistent with our holding today, it is hereby overruled.
Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The contrary teaching of Whitney v. Rabinowitz and Harris have been the subject of critical commentary for many years, and have been relied upon less and less in our own decisions. It is time, for the reasons we have stated, to hold that on their own facts, and insofar as the principles they stand for are inconsistent with those that we have endorsed today, they are no longer to be followed.
For the same reasons, we today find that the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Insofar as it is inconsistent with this holding, Palko v. Connecticut is overruled.
The doctrine of Benton v. New Jersey The question is no longer whether collateral estoppel is a requirement of due process, but whether it is a part of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy. While the Brantley holding may have had some vitality at the time the Georgia courts rendered their decisions in this case, it is no longer a viable authority and must now be deemed to have been overruled by subsequent decisions of this Court. This Court's earlier decisions have assumed an affirmative answer to this question.
The leading case so construing the Sixth Amendment is Thompson v. Utah, U. The defendant's new trial proceeded under Utah's Constitution, providing for a jury of only eight members. This Court reversed the resulting conviction, holding that Utah's constitutional provision was an ex post facto law as applied to the defendant.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court announced that the Sixth Amendment was applicable to the defendant's trial when Utah was a Territory, and that the jury referred to in the Amendment was a jury "constituted, as it was at common law, of twelve persons, neither more nor less.
Whether or not Collins v. Hardyman was correctly decided on its own facts is a question with which we need not here be concerned. But it is clear, in the light of the evolution of decisional law in the years that have passed since that case was decided, that many of the constitutional problems there perceived simply do not exist.
Quaker City Cab Co. Pennsylvania is only a relic of a bygone era. We cannot follow it and stay within the narrow confines of judicial review, which is an important part of our constitutional tradition. But now the Memoirs test has been abandoned as unworkable by its author, and no Member of the Court today supports the Memoirs formulation.
The Liggett case was a creation at war with the earlier constitutional view of legislative power The Liggett case, being a derelict in the stream of the law, is hereby overruled.
Internal citations omitted. Zarate, U. This case, therefore, is the first opportunity the Court has taken to fully explore and treat the Eleventh Amendment aspects of such relief in a written opinion. Shapiro v. Thompson and these three summary affirmances obviously are of precedential value in support of the contention that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the relief awarded by the District Court in this case. Equally obviously, they are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits.
Since we deal with a constitutional question, we are less constrained by the principle of stare decisis than we are in other areas of the law. Having now had an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings of those cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our holding today. Accepting as we do, however, the view that the Sixth Amendment affords the defendant in a criminal trial the opportunity to have the jury drawn from venires representative of the community, we think it is no longer tenable to hold that women as a class may be excluded or given automatic exemptions based solely on sex if the consequence is that criminal jury venires are almost totally male.
To this extent we cannot follow the contrary implications of the prior cases, including Hoyt v. We affirm without addressing the question whether the Georgia Supreme Court was correct in holding that the tires had lost their status as imports. We hold that, in any event, Georgia's assessment of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax against the imported tires is not within the constitutional prohibition against laying "any Imposts or Duties on Imports It matters not that some Members of the Court may continue to believe that the Logan Valley case was rightly decided.
Our institutional duty is to follow until changed the law as it now is, not as some Members of the Court might wish it to be. And in the performance of that duty we make clear now, if it was not clear before, that the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the Court's decision in the Lloyd case. Not only did the Lloyd opinion incorporate lengthy excerpts from two of the dissenting opinions in Logan Valley; the ultimate holding in Lloyd amounted to a total rejection of the holding in Logan Valley The appellants contend that the advertisement of prescription drug prices is outside the protection of the First Amendment because it is "commercial speech.
In Valentine v. Since the decision in Breard, however, the Court has never denied protection on the ground that the speech in issue was "commercial speech. While there are obvious differences between the schools and hospitals involved in Wirtz, and the fire and police departments affected here, each provides an integral portion of those governmental services which the States and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens.
We are therefore persuaded that Wirtz must be overruled. Morey is, as appellee and the Court of Appeals properly recognized, essentially indistinguishable from this case, but the decision so far departs from proper equal protection analysis in cases of exclusively economic regulation that it should be, and it is, overruled. While Furman did not overrule McGautha, it is clearly in substantial tension with a broad reading of McGautha's holding. In view of Furman, McGautha can be viewed rationally as a precedent only for the proposition that standardless jury sentencing procedures were not employed in the cases there before the Court so as to violate the Due Process Clause.
We note that McGautha's assumption that it is not possible to devise standards to guide and regularize jury sentencing in capital cases has been undermined by subsequent experience. In view of that experience and the considerations set forth in the text, we adhere to Furman's determination that where the ultimate punishment of death is at issue a system of standardless jury discretion violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Insofar as Goesaert v. Undoubtedly reflecting the view that Goesaert's equal protection analysis no longer obtains, the District Court made no reference to that decision in upholding Oklahoma's statute. Similarly, the opinions of the federal and state courts cited earlier in the text invalidating gender lines with respect to alcohol regulation uniformly disparaged the contemporary vitality of Goesaert. Upon full reconsideration of our decision in Bonelli, we conclude that it was wrong in treating the equal-footing doctrine as a source of federal common law after that doctrine had vested title to the riverbed in the State of Arizona as of the time of its admission to the Union.
We also think there was no other basis in that case, nor is there any in this case, to support the application of federal common law to override state real property law. It would not be fruitful for us to re-examine the facts of cases decided on the rationales of Pennoyer and Harris to determine whether jurisdiction might have been sustained under the standard we adopt today. To the extent that prior decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled.
Forman v. United States, U. Since we hold today that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient, the only "just" remedy available for that court is the direction of a judgment of acquittal.
To the extent that our prior decisions suggest that by moving for a new trial, a defendant waives his right to a judgment of acquittal on the basis of evidentiary insufficiency, those cases are overruled. Yet, though our assessment of the history and meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause in Wilson, Jenkins, and Serfass v.
It placed an unwarrantedly great emphasis on the defendant's right to have his guilt decided by the first jury empaneled to try him so as to include those cases where the defendant himself seeks to terminate the trial before verdict on grounds unrelated to factual guilt or innocence. We have therefore decided to overrule Jenkins Today we hold that defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated.
The automatic standing rule of Jones v. Our decision today is inconsistent with the disposition in Robbins v. California and with the portion of the opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders on which the plurality in Robbins relied. Nevertheless, the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this action. Although we have rejected some of the reasoning in Sanders, we adhere to our holding in that case; although we reject the precise holding in Robbins, there was no Court opinion supporting a single rationale for its judgment, and the reasoning we adopt today was not presented by the parties in that case.
But there can no longer be any doubt that racial discrimination in education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice. Prior to , public education in many places still was conducted under the pall of Plessy v. Ferguson, U. This Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, U. For all these reasons, we conclude that it is wiser to abandon the "two-pronged test" established by our decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli.
In its place we reaffirm the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable-cause determinations. The dissent in Larson made many of the arguments advanced by Justice Stevens['] dissent today, and asserted that many of the same cases were being overruled or ignored.
Those arguments were rejected, and the cases supporting them are moribund. Since Larson was decided in , no opinion by any Member of this Court has cited the cases on which the dissent primarily relies for a proposition as broad as the language the dissent quotes. Many if not most of these cases have not been relied upon in an Eleventh Amendment context at all.
Indeed, for nearly a century, the analytical underpinnings of Coffey have been recognized as less than adequate. The time has come to clarify that neither collateral estoppel nor double jeopardy bars a civil, remedial forfeiture proceeding initiated following an acquittal on related criminal charges.
To the extent that Coffey v. United States suggests otherwise, it is hereby disapproved. Although Hooven I was not expressly overruled in Michelin, it must be regarded as retaining no vitality since the Michelin decision So that there may be no misunderstanding, Hooven I, to the extent it espouses that doctrine, is not to be regarded as authority and is overruled.
Our examination of this "function" standard applied in these and other cases over the last eight years now persuades us that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of "traditional governmental function" is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very federalism principles on which National League of Cities purported to rest.
That case, accordingly, is overruled. To the extent Bain stands for the proposition that it constitutes an unconstitutional amendment to drop from an indictment those allegations that are unnecessary to an offense that is clearly contained within it, that case has simply not survived. To avoid further confusion, we now explicitly reject that proposition.
Parratt is overruled to the extent that it states that mere lack of due care by a state official may "deprive" an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent that anything in Swain v. Kentucky v. Dennison is the product of another time.
The conception of the relation between the States and the Federal Government there announced is fundamentally incompatible with more than a century of constitutional development We conclude that it may stand no longer. This case presents the question whether the jurisdiction of a court-martial convened pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice U. We hold that it does not, and overrule our earlier decision in O'Callahan v. Accordingly, to the extent that Parden v.
Terminal Railway We thus confirm that subsequent case law has overruled the holding in Pollock that state bond interest is immune from a nondiscriminatory federal tax. Any attempt to justify a similar categorical distinction between incoming correspondence from prisoners to which we applied a reasonableness standard in Turner and incoming correspondence from nonprisoners would likely prove futile, and we do not invite it.
To the extent that Martinez itself suggests such a distinction, we today overrule that case; the Court accomplished much of this step when it decided Turner. Believing, as we do, that there is no basis for a presumption of vindictiveness where a second sentence imposed after a trial is heavier than a first sentence imposed after a guilty plea, we overrule Simpson v. The holding in Kring can only be justified if the Ex Post Facto Clause is thought to include not merely the Calder categories, but any change which "alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage.
We accordingly overrule Kring The Court's holding in Thompson v. Utah that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury panel of 12 persons is also obsolete. Although we have recognized firmly that the doctrine of stare decisis serves profoundly important purposes in our legal system, this Court has overruled a prior case on the comparatively rare occasion when it has bred confusion or been a derelict or led to anomalous results.
Sanders was explicitly undermined in Ross, and the existence of the dual regimes for automobile searches that uncover containers has proved as confusing as the Chadwick and Sanders dissenters predicted. We conclude that it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in Sanders. Booth and Gathers were decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions.
They have been questioned by Members of the Court in later decisions and have defied consistent application by the lower courts. Reconsidering these decisions now, we conclude, for the reasons heretofore stated, that they were wrongly decided and should be, and now are, overruled.
Thus, to the extent that our decisions have indicated that the Due Process Clause requires physical presence in a State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those holdings as superseded by developments in the law of due process.
Thornburgh v. Akron Ctr. Although we must overrule those parts of Thornburgh and Akron I which, in our view, are inconsistent with Roe's statement that the State has a legitimate interest in promoting the life or potential life of the unborn the central premise of those cases represents an unbroken commitment by this Court to the essential holding of Roe.
Today we adhere to Scott v. Accordingly we hold, consistent with the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction.
In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests. To the extent that Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with that holding, it is overruled. And we think stare decisis cannot possibly be controlling when, in addition to those factors, the decision in question has been proved manifestly erroneous, and its underpinnings eroded, by subsequent decisions of this Court.
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the Federal Government. Without questioning the holding in LaRue, we now disavow its reasoning insofar as it relied on the Twenty-first Amendment.
We therefore overrule Ball and Aguilar to the extent those decisions are inconsistent with our current understanding of the Establishment Clause.
We believe that Halper's deviation from longstanding double jeopardy principles was ill considered. As subsequent cases have demonstrated, Halper's test for determining whether a particular sanction is "punitive," and thus subject to the strictures of the Double Jeopardy Clause, has proved unworkable.
Race Horse rested on the premise that treaty rights are irreconcilable with state sovereignty. It is this conclusion—the conclusion undergirding the Race Horse Court's equal footing holding—that we have consistently rejected over the years.
We think that the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was ill conceived, and see no merit in attempting to salvage any remnant of it. As we explain below in detail, Parden broke sharply with prior cases, and is fundamentally incompatible with later ones In short, Parden stands as an anomaly in the jurisprudence of sovereign immunity, and indeed in the jurisprudence of constitutional law. Today, we drop the other shoe: Whatever may remain of our decision in Parden is expressly overruled.
Accordingly, we hold that Chapter 2 is not a law respecting an establishment of religion. Jefferson Parish need not exclude religious schools from its Chapter 2 program. To the extent that Meek and Wolman conflict with this holding, we overrule them. We now overrule Evans insofar as it holds that the Compensation Clause forbids Congress to apply a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory tax to the salaries of federal judges, whether or not they were appointed before enactment of the tax.
Finding Ford inconsistent with the basic rationale of that line of cases, we consequently overrule Ford insofar as it would otherwise apply. Insofar as it held that a defective indictment deprives a court of jurisdiction, Bain is overruled. Much has changed since then The practice, therefore, has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it.
Accordingly, we overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled. These considerations mean Stanford v.
Kentucky should be deemed no longer controlling on this issue. To the extent Stanford was based on review of the objective indicia of consensus that obtained in , it suffices to note that those indicia have changed It is also inconsistent with the premises of our recent decision in Atkins.
We acknowledge that statements in both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Seminole Tribe of Fla. Florida, U. See also Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept.
Careful study and reflection have convinced us, however, that that assumption was erroneous. On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory. In sum, when the marginal benefits of the Jackson rule are weighed against its substantial costs to the truth-seeking process and the criminal justice system, we readily conclude that the rule does not "pay its way," Michigan v.
Jackson should be and now is overruled. The McConnell Court relied on the antidistortion interest recognized in Austin to uphold a greater restriction on speech than the restriction upheld in Austin, and we have found this interest unconvincing and insufficient. This part of McConnell is now overruled. Mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime.
It follows, then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an "element" that must be submitted to the jury. Accordingly, Harris is overruled. Baker v. Nelson must be and now is overruled, and the State laws challenged by Petitioners in these cases are now held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.
We hold that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act violates the Constitution's guarantee of due process. Our contrary holdings in James and Sykes are overruled. Spaziano and Hildwin summarized earlier precedent to conclude that "the Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury.
Quill Corp. North Dakota, U. Dep't of Revenue of Illinois, U. For these reasons, the Court concludes that the physical presence rule of Quill is unsound and incorrect. The Court's decisions in Quill Corp. Department of Revenue of Ill. The dissent's reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—"has no place in law under the Constitution.
All these reasons—that Abood's proponents have abandoned its reasoning, that the precedent has proved unworkable, that it conflicts with other First Amendment decisions, and that subsequent developments have eroded its underpinnings—provide the "special justification[s]" for overruling Abood. Citation omitted. For early cases in which the Supreme Court established its power of judicial review, see Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U. Peck, 10 U. Virginia, 19 U. Black's Law Dictionary 10 th ed. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Power of Precedent —48 [hereinafter Gerhardt, Power of Precedent] "[I]t is practically impossible to find any modern Court decision that fails to cite at least some precedents in support.
However, although the Supreme Court routinely purports to rely upon precedent, it is difficult to determine precisely how often precedent has actually constrained the Court's decisions because the Justices have latitude in how broadly or narrowly they construe their prior decisions.
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